The following Report will be presented to the 22 nd FIDE Congress to be held in Limassol, Cyprus, 1-4 November 2006. It has been prepared in response to a questionnaire devised by the General Rapporteur, Professor Piet Eeckhout, which is reproduced as an Annex. It seeks to do two things: first, to respond to the questions and issues raised by the General Rapporteur, and second to comment on some issues and recent developments which are particularly relevant to the relationship between the European Union and its Member States in the external relations field. These include the obligation on Member States when exercising their own external competence to comply with their Community law obligations, including procedural obligations; issues relating to choice of legal base for external action, and in particular the impact of the pillar structure when characterising EU external action; international responsibility under mixed agreements; and the relationship between international law and EU law.
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Exclusivity
It is striking but not surprising that the conditions under which exclusive Community competence to enter into external agreements arises are still the subject of both academic discussion, institutional debate and new case law. In Opinion 1/2003 2 the Court of Justice was able to elucidate its 2002 judgements in the Open Skies cases, 3 in particular as to the conditions under which exclusive competence arises, and demonstrates the detailed analysis of a prospective agreement that will often be necessary before such a question can be answered. The Opinion offers us a comment on Open Skies, and a(nother) reformulation of the AETR test which shows that it is still very much the basis of the Court's reasoning in this area. It deals with a relatively new area of Community competence (judicial cooperation in civil matters) about which there are differing views among the Member States on the scope and nature of Community external competence. 4 It is not appropriate here to give a detailed analysis of every aspect of Opinion 1/03; instead a number of points may be made.
First, it is worth noting the Court's affirmation that the implied external competence of the Community may be either exclusive or shared. In spite of Opinion 2/91, 5 some earlier case law, by eliding the issues of the existence of competence and its exclusivity, had cast doubt on the possibility of implied shared competence. 6 In Opinion 1/03 such doubts are laid to rest, the Court clearly stating that implied competence may be either exclusive or shared. 7 The point is significant when one considers the extent to which 2 
Opinion 1/03 of 7 February 2006 on the competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2006] ECR 0000. The Opinion was requested by the Council, which observed however that it was not seeking to argue either for or against exclusive competence but was seeking a clarification of the division of competence between the Community and Member States in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, an issue which arises in practice and on which the Member States are divided. 3 concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work. 6 For example, Opinion 1/94 and also the Open Skies cases themselves. In Case C-467/98 Commission v Denmark, for example, the Court said, in the context of a discussion of possible exclusive competence, "It must next be determined under what circumstances the scope of the common rules may be affected or distorted by the international commitments at issue and, therefore, under what circumstances the Community acquires an external competence by reason of the exercise of its internal competence." (at para 81). 7 Opinion 1/03, paras 114-115. The existence of implied competence in this case was not disputed, although the relevant Treaty provision from which it was implied (Art 65 EC) requires action to be taken "insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market"; the Court bases itself on the fact that internal legislation had been adopted in the field (notably Regulation 44/2001). The question of whether that legislation might be affected within the meaning of AETR (and thus give rise the growing Community acquis in the field of Justice and Home Affairs provides the basis for Community external competence. 8 Second, the Court was clearly of the view (rightly so) that Opinion 1/76 could not apply in this case; in fact in no case since Opinion 1/76 itself has this ground of exclusivity based on necessity been applied in practice. The test was formulated at a time when the Court of Justice was still developing its ideas of implied external competence (in particular the relationship between the existence and the exclusivity of competence), and has been subject to convincing academic criticism. 9 Opinion 1/76 would be better regarded as an example of the existence of competence even in the absence of prior internal legislation; 10 it is not demonstrably necessary for the Union legal order that such competence should be exclusive per se; the other conditions of exclusivity (in particular the AETR test) are sufficient. 11 However although the Court does not in Opinion 1/03 discuss the application of Opinion 1/76 it clearly confirms its continued theoretical existence as a separate basis for exclusive competence and in its formulation of the test potentially widens the grounds for exclusivity, by omitting the idea of an "inextricable link" between external and internal action, the need to act simultaneously at both levels. 12 Third, the Court's formulation of the AETR test is striking in its emphasis on the unity of the common market, the uniform and consistent application and the effectiveness of The General Law of EC External Relations, 13-14. 10 
P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, Legal and Constitutional Foundations
(Oxford), 68. 11 As Heliskoski points out, "the rationale for exclusivity [in Opinion 1/76] is the same as that in the AETR judgement, only the common rules would have been introduced by international agreement and not by an autonomous legislative act of the Community." J. Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements, p.44. 12 "As regards exclusive competence, the Court has held that the situation envisaged in Opinion 1/76 is that in which internal competence may be effectively exercised only at the same time as external competence (see Opinion 1/76, paragraphs 4 and 7, and Opinion 1/94, paragraph 85), the conclusion of the international agreement being thus necessary in order to attain objectives of the Treaty that cannot be attained by establishing autonomous rules (see, in particular, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 57)." Opinion 1/2003, para 115; this formulation essentially repeats the formulation offered by the Council (see para 37) but omits the reference to the "inextricable link" found in Opinion 1/94 para 86 and also cited by the Council. On the inextricable link and the need to act externally and internally at the same time, Community law and the proper functioning of the system. 13 It is the purpose of exclusive competence that is emphasised rather than the need to fall within one of several specific situations that have been found in the past to give rise to exclusive competence, situations which are now referred to as "only examples". 14 Such an approach might be expected to be more flexible; however, when the Court turns to the proposed Convention itself in order to apply these tests, it subjects its provisions to a very detailed analysis, concluding that indeed exclusive competence is justified on the ground that the uniform and consistent application of Community rules, in particular the complex regime established by Regulation 44/2001, would be affected by the proposed new Lugano Convention.
Fourth, the Court's attitude to so-called "disconnection clauses" should be mentioned. Such clauses are designed to protect the autonomy of the Community legal order, by providing that as between EU Member State parties to an international agreement, the relevant provisions of Community law shall apply. 15 They are facilitative of mixed agreements in areas of law which may have an impact on the Community legal order and have been used extensively in multilateral conventions such as those adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe. As the Court rightly points out, these clauses are intended to ensure compliance, to avoid conflict between systems and to make it clear that the joint participation of the Community and its Member States will not alter the scope of Community law in relations between the Member States themselves, thus ensuring the primacy of Community law. They indicate to other Contracting Parties that the agreement is one in which there is a Community competence and Community rules to apply, but do not give any indication of the scope or nature of Community (or Member State) competence. However the Court goes further and adds a warning: disconnection clauses, it says, such as that in Article 54B of the Lugano Convention 16 which was to serve as a model for the proposed new clause, not only do not guarantee that Community rules are not affected but "on the contrary may provide an indication that those rules are affected". 17 This is of course the language of AETR; if Member States feel that by including a disconnection clause they are signalling that this is an area of possible exclusive competence (because Community rules are likely to be affected) the clause is much less likely to be acceptable, and a useful way of managing agreements of genuinely shared competence will be lost. which the competence of the Community to conclude the proposed Lugano Convention is founded. It is not bound by Regulation 44/2001 and so has concluded a separate agreement with the Community which extends the provisions of that Regulation to Denmark. 18 As it would not be bound to Lugano II by virtue of Community participation, Denmark will participate in Lugano II in its own right. In spite of the Court's comments about the unity and coherence of the Community legal order, therefore, the potential for breaching that unity is already present. The Community has exclusive competence, but Denmark is able to conclude the Convention on its own account. What would be the legal position if Denmark were to fail to conclude Lugano II, or were to negotiate an agreement on its own account with another third country in the field covered by the Convention? Presumably Article 10 EC imposes an obligation on Denmark not to disrupt the development of the Community legal order even in fields in which it does not participate. 19 Opinion 1/03 provides a rich opportunity for reflection on the nature and scope of non-a priori exclusive competence, of which only an indication has been given here. It is evidence that the AETR approach is still very much the basis and starting point of the Court's reasoning on exclusivity in relation to implied powers, and it offers a bold assertion of exclusivity in an area relatively new to Community competence. Coming after a number of more restrictive judgements, that is of significance in itself. However it is important to say that the field covered by the Opinion is a very specific one, and one in which the Community legal regime is extensive. The field covered by the Convention was one which would directly impact on the behaviour of courts in third countries; it was not therefore a case where the Community could have taken "concerted action" via autonomous legislation. 20 It should not be regarded as opening the door to a new wider reading of the scope of exclusivity, but rather as a signal that the approach to be adopted should focus on the overall nature and effect of an agreement on the Community legal order. It confirms the impression of Open Skies that such an enquiry will require a "comprehensive and detailed analysis" of a prospective agreement and of Community law. 21 Even well established fields of exclusive Community competence can give rise to new problems. The accession of ten new Member States in 2004 has provided an occasion to review the consequences of the a priori exclusivity of the common commercial policy (CCP) for both existing and new Member States. As is well known, "measures of commercial policy of a national character are only permissible after the end of the 18 Council Decision 2005/790/EC on the signing on behalf of the Community of the Agreement between the EC and Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2005 L 299/61. 19 C.f. Art 23(1) TEU. Article 5 of the Agreement with Denmark (see note 16) attempts to deal with the second issue by providing inter alia that Denmark will abstain from concluding such an agreement "unless it is done in agreement with the Community and satisfactory arrangements have been made with regard to the relationship between this Agreement and the international agreement in question".
It also provides that Denmark will "abstain from any actions that would jeopardise the objectives of a Community position within its sphere of competence," an obligation that would apply to Danish participation in Lugano II. These obligations flow from the EC-Denmark agreement, however, not directly from Community law. 20 Opinion 1/03, para 123. 21 Opinion 1/03, para 133. transitional period by virtue of specific authorization by the Community". 22 An example of such authorization has been the Council Decisions authorising the renewal or continuation in force of provisions governing matters covered by the CCP contained in the Member States' trade and cooperation agreements with third countries. 23 Following the 2004 enlargement, the Commission submitted a proposal to extend the then current authorization to certain agreements of the new Member States; however the scrutiny of existing agreements of the new Member States prompted re-consideration of all existing Member State agreements and no agreement was reached before expiry of the authorization Decision itself. 24 At present, therefore, authorization has lapsed; the rights of third States are protected by Article 307 EC, where agreements were concluded before the entry into force of the EC Treaty, or before accession of the relevant Member State; however in case of conflict the Member States are under an obligation to re-negotiate or denounce the agreements. 25
Compliance
Where Community competence is exclusive, "Member States may not enter into international commitments outside the framework of the Community institutions, even if there is no contradiction between those commitments and the common rules." 26 Compliance -in the sense of the need to avoid contradiction -should not arise where competence is exclusive. Where Member States retain competence, or where that competence is shared with the Community, however, the need to comply with Community law imposes a significant constraint upon Member States. The overall basis for this obligation is of course Article 10 EC, together with the duty of cooperation, a principle developed in the context of mixed agreements and which derives from the requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community. 27 The principle of cooperation can now be seen as a constitutional principle within EC external relations law. 28 It is not of course limited to the Member States and also applies 22 
Legal base and inter-pillar issues
From the point of view of the Community institutions, the question of characterisation of an international agreement and the legal base for its conclusion could be said to be of greater importance than the issue of exclusivity. Of course, the existence of an appropriate legal base is a necessary basis for the existence of competence, and so is the more fundamental question. 46 In addition, the choice of legal base is relevant in determining procedures to be followed (for example, the role of the European Parliament). As such it has internal constitutional/institutional implications as well as impacting on the scope of Community competence and its nature (exclusive or shared). The trade/environment interface has given rise to several legal base disputes, at an internal level as well as in external relations. 47 questions, 49 the Court, having decided that this was case of genuinely dual legal base and therefore that the Decision should have been based on both Articles 133 and 175(1), 50 discussed the implications of its finding purely in terms of procedure. Its conclusion was that there was no procedural incompatibility between the legal bases, the voting procedure in the Council being the same under both provisions, and the Parliament's prerogatives safeguarded by the use of Article 175 (2) . However although the Advocate General had taken the view that (for these reasons) the defect was purely formal and should not therefore necessitate annulment, 51 the Court annulled the Decision. The legal effects of such an annulment are in this case minimised: the Convention had been implemented by a Regulation, which was also annulled, in a separate case, for the same reasons. 52 However the legal effects of that Regulation were preserved under Article 231 EC, and so the Community's implementation of the Convention is not put into question. It is noticeable, however, that the Court does not regard the issue of legal base as a purely internal affair. On the contrary, it confirms the importance of the correct legal base as a signal to other Contracting Parties of the extent of Community competence and the division of competence between the Community and the Member States, which, it says, is also relevant to the implementation of the agreement at Community level. 53 This might seem a somewhat surprising statement: in earlier cases the Court has taken a clear view that the distribution of competence between the Community and Member States is an internal question. 54 In Chapter 2 we will explore further both the internal and the international dimensions to the question of responsibility for the implementation of mixed agreements. There is a danger, if decisions as to legal base are seen as a signal to third countries, that the issue of choice 49 The Commission proposal for the conclusion of the Convention was based solely on Articles 133 and 300 EC and stated that "the Community is competent in respect of all matters governed by the of legal base will become even more policiticised than it is already, making it more difficult to base that choice purely on "objective factors which are amenable to judicial review". 55 The reference to implementation of the agreement is understandable in the instant case, as the Court was on the same day and on the same grounds giving judgement on the legal base of the implementing Regulation. However it is by no means always the case that the legal base for the conclusion of an agreement will signal the appropriate legal base for its implementation. 56 The relation between legal bases for internal and external action was also at issue in another pending case which raises important issues relating to the characterisation of international agreements, as well as the inter-relationship between the pillars. In the Passenger Name Records (PNR) cases, the European Parliament is challenging the conclusion by the Council of an agreement with the United States on the processing and transfer of PNR data, and a Decision adopted by the Commission finding that the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection provides an adequate level of protection of PNR data under the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC). 57 Of the number of grounds of review raised by the Parliament we will here focus on the issue of legal base. The PNR agreement was concluded on the basis of Article 95 EC which was also the legal base of the internal measure, the Data Protection Directive. AG Leger argued, however, that it did not necessarily follow that the appropriate legal base for action internally is appropriate for external action. 58 This is no doubt true, but let us unpack the question a little. It may be that there is an express legal base in the Treaty for external action; notwithstanding the existence of "internal" legal bases such as Articles 43, 175 or 95 EC for example, where an agreement has a direct impact on trade in goods the appropriate legal base will be Article 133. 59 In cases of implied competence, on the other hand, an "internal" legal base will inevitably be used; the question is then whether the agreement serves to further the objectives of the EC Treaty as expressed in that internal legal base, the existence of prior internal legislation being relevant (under the AETR test) to the question of exclusivity. 60 In fact, the discussion in AG Leger's Opinion centres around this point: can it be said that the PNR Agreement serves to fulfil the objectives of Article 95? The Council put forward internal market arguments for the conclusion of the agreement, based on distortions of competition and problems with the single airline market as a result of US policy in the absence of an agreement. The Advocate General took the view that even if these arguments were to be accepted, the internal market objective could only be regarded as incidental; the major objectives of the agreement, set out in its Preamble, are two-fold: the prevention of terrorism and organised crime, and the protection of fundamental rights, especially privacy. The agreement itself does not appear to have an internal market objective and a legal base should reflect the objectives of the agreement rather than those of the Community institutions in concluding that agreement (as evidenced for example in the concluding Decision). However it is arguable that in determining legal base it is appropriate to look not only at the objectives of an agreement but also at its effects; if its effects will contribute to achieving the Treaty objective set out in a particular legal base (such as the proper functioning of the internal market in Article 95 EC) then arguably this should be sufficient.
The PNR case also raises a more fundamental issue: that of inter-pillar demarcation of legal base. Although not strictly necessary to the case itself, the Advocate General does touch on an alternative legal base for the agreement (Article 95 EC being in his view inadequate), mentioning the possibility of the third pillar and perhaps also the second. 61 As he says, the Court of First Instance (CFI) has pointed out that the fight against terrorism is not an objective of the EC Treaty but rather of the TEU. 62 To what extent is it possible to use Community powers (including external competence) to achieve objectives that are specific to the CFSP or to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJC) under the third pillar? Where there is a clear Community competence, such as trade policy, or development cooperation policy, there is no reason why that competence cannot be used in ways which support broader TEU (including second or third pillar) objectives. The CFI took the view, however, (in my view correctly) that to seek to use the EC's "flexibility clause" under Article 308 EC for purely Union (TEU) objectives would be to undermine the "constitutional architecture of the pillars" and the "integrated but separate" Union and Community legal orders. Just as the powers of the Union under the TEU should not be used in such a way as to "affect" the acquis communautaire (Article 47 TEU), to accept the use of Article 308 alone to achieve any TEU objective would be inconsistent with the specific powers and instruments under the CFSP and PJC provisions of the TEU. 63 In the case of economic sanctions, on the other hand, there is an explicit passerelle written into Articles 301 and 60 EC, referring to a Joint Action or Common Position adopted under the TEU. In Yusuf and Kadi, this was held to "import" TEU objectives into the Community legal order in this specific field 64 and thus to justify the extension of sanctions instruments to individuals by using Article 308, not alone but alongside Articles 301 and 60 EC, a conclusion that has attracted criticism as well as praise. 65 The link between CFSP objectives as expressed in a common position, Articles 301 and 60 EC, and Article 308 EC does indeed appear somewhat tenuous, and even more tenuous is the link to the operation of the common market that Article 308 in theory requires. 66 Nevertheless the alternative, the use of the TEU as a sole legal basis for sanctions against individuals, leads to the denial of any rights of judicial review at Community or Union level. 67 More broadly we can identify a tension between (on the one hand) the creation of a European Union which is "founded on the European Communities," which is intended to operate under a single institutional framework and to "assert its identity on the international scene" through consistent external action, and (on the other hand) a system of very different institutional bases for action and legal instruments (CFSP, PJC, EC Treaty). Increasingly the relationship between these legal bases and legal instruments, and the proper use of one rather than another, will come to the fore. The position is made more difficult by the absence of the Court of Justice's jurisdiction under the CFSP and its restrictive scope under the PJC; however there are signs that a creative use will be made of its powers under Article 47 TEU. 68 Two further pending cases illustrate the difficult questions as to choice of legal base between the pillars that can and will arise. In particular both cases illustrate the difficult relationship, legally speaking, between security and development. both policy areas
have a somewhat open-ended nature and it is easy to see that policies or activities might well be found to have both a security and a development dimension. As we have seen there is no problem with the Community using its development policy powers to assist in achieving the Union's Security Strategy. 69 However in a case brought by the European Parliament against the Commission in relation to the Philippines border mission, the Parliament argues that the Regulation which provides the financial basis for the mission 70 has an essentially development objective and should not be used for action which is designed to assist in combating terrorism rather than development. 71 In a second case, the Commission has challenged the Council's use of a CFSP measure to give financial assistance to ECOWAS in the field of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). 72 The control of SALW has been the subject of action both within the CFSP 73 and the Community's development policy. 74 In Clearly the Council is concerned that the Commission will use the potential breadth of development policy to ring-fence (via Article 47 TEU) an increasingly large slice of security policy; the Commission is concerned that the Council will increasingly encroach on development policy objectives by claiming a security dimension. There seems no doubt that the EC could choose to act under Community powers in this area. 75 In such a case, which is one of non-preemptive development cooperation, the Member States may choose to act themselves either unilaterally or collectively; 76 does Article 47 TEU prevent them from choosing to act through a CFSP instrument? However necessary it may be, Article 47 EC potentially creates an obstacle for developing fully integrated policies across the Union, and the Constitutional Treaty would not remove the obstacle. On the contrary, since the equivalent to Article 47 TEU (Article 308 CT) looks in both directions, protecting not only the acquis communautaire but also the CFSP chapter from encroachment. Given the potential breadth of CFSP activity the precise relationship between the CFSP chapter and the other chapters of Title V of the Constitutional Treaty will need clarification.
A further context in which Article 47 TEU can cause difficulty, which might be termed "inter-pillar mixity", arises where it is agreed that a particular international agreement covers both CFSP and EC fields of activity. Agreements covering more than one pillar are legally possible, 77 but the relationship between the different elements may be problematic. For example, an agreement may cover trade, economic cooperation and development, but also contain clauses on weapons of mass destruction or cooperation in relation to anti-terrorism. 78 The Council in relation to non-proliferation might trigger action under the trade provisions of the agreement. As we know, in the case of economic sanctions, such a bridge is explicitly built into the EC Treaty but even in this case a separate EC Treaty-based legal act is required. Article 47 TEU precludes action which might "affect" the Community acquis; it is not clear whether such an effect takes place where relations with a third country in a field covered by the acquis are determined as a result of a Council act in the CFSP field. In all probability Article 47 would require that the link should not be made automatic or explicit; but such a result is hardly conducive to transparency. Issues relating to implementation and enforcement of such inter-pillar mixed agreements also need to be worked out. The duty of cooperation is a useful starting point, and it can be argued that this duty applies across the pillars as it does in relation to shared competence. 79 However this cooperation must take place in the context of the need to safeguard the autonomy of the Community legal order and the different institutional balance in the different pillars. Putting this simply: how is it possible, in a case of interpillar mixity, to ensure that the Commission takes its proper lead in implementing those parts of the agreement that fall within Community competence, and that the Council takes the lead on CFSP and PJC matters, while still maintaining effective coordination of policy and a coherent presentation of the "EU position" 80 to its contracting partners?
To conclude this chapter: although exclusive competence is still an issue which gives rise to uncertainty and debate, and the AETR principle is having the effect of creating new Community competences as the EC acquis grows, especially in areas of Justice and Home Affairs, it is at least as important to examine the constraints on Member States in the exercise of their own competence, whether or not shared with the Community. These constraints operate at the substantive and procedural levels and derive ultimately from the loyalty principle in Article 10 EC and the duty of cooperation. From the point of view of the Community institutions the most important issues of competence relate to questions of characterisation of agreements and legal base, especially the demarcation of competence across the pillars and issues arising from the relatively new phenomenon of inter-pillar mixity. A number of questions relating to the interpretation of Article 47 TEU n cases of inter-pillar competence have yet to be resolved.
Chapter 2 -Mixed agreements and international responsibility
Internal constitutional aspects of mixed agreements
In this section we will consider some aspects of the Member States' responsibility in Community Law for the performance of Community agreements (including mixed agreements). Our starting point must be the Community law obligation to perform the 79 C. Hillion, The evolving system of European Union external relations as evidenced in the EU Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, thesis, University of Leiden 2005. 80 The term EU may be used in different ways: to refer to the second and third pillar powers only, or as a reference to the EU as the over-arching entity bringing together all three pillars. Ambiguity between these meanings of the term also risks ambiguity as to the allocation of competence between EC and EU.
agreement derived from Art 300(7) and Art 10 EC, which is separable from their obligations (in international law) as parties to mixed agreements.
"In ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the Community institutions the Member States fulfil an obligation not only in relation to the non-member country concerned but also and above all in relation to the Community which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the Agreement. In this case the reference to the Community interest is linked to the fact that Community legislation overlaps with the Berne Convention (i.e. that part of the mixed agreement concerning which compliance was at issue). However in Commission v France (Étang de Berre), the ECJ held that a Member State could be in breach of its Community law obligations by failing to implement a mixed agreement, even though the alleged breach concerned an aspect of the agreement which was not covered by Community legislation; it was enough that the field in general was "covered in large measure" by Community legislation and in such cases "there is a Community interest in compliance by both the Community and its Member States with the commitments citing Kupferberg, that "in ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the Community institutions the Member States fulfil, within the Community system, an obligation in relation to the Community, which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the Agreement" (para 11). 88 See further the discussion in section 2 of this Chapter. 89 For example, J. Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements, pp. 46-47. "…the justification for the participation of the Member States is to be found precisely in the circumstance that the Community has not decidedand upon the conclusion of a given agreement does not decide -actually to exercise its non-exclusive competence, which makes it possible for the Member States to act under their own powers. But this must however mean that the Community's participation is legally only relevant insofar as the Community's exclusive competence is concerned; the rest of the commitments are assumed by the Member States in their individual capacity." (emphasis in the original) 90 entered into." 91 Rosas notes that in these cases the Court, by asking whether the field is "covered in large measure" by Community rules, appears to be favouring the approach to competence and exclusivity developed in Opinion 2/91 rather than its AETR approach. 92 AG Poiares Maduro in the Sellafield case 93 also makes the link with competence, arguing that the Court is here holding that the Community did actually exercise a non-exclusive competence over the whole agreement when it was concluded, even though there was no existing Community legislation covering parts of it. However, the question of compliance and responsibility once an agreement has been concluded is rather different from the issue of competence to conclude the agreement, and the Court clearly sees a Community interest in holding the Member States to account under Community law for the whole of a mixed agreement, at least where it is a matter of shared competence. Once the agreement has been concluded, it has become a part of Community law and the Community interest is relevant to its enforcement as well as its interpretation. 94 It is significant that the Court's reasoning is ultimately based on the Community interest and the scope of Community law, rather than on competence. As Dashwood has said, the limits of Community powers are not the same as the limits of the scope of application of the Treaty, the objectives of the Treaty being attained through action not only of the Community itself but also by the Member States. 95 The approach might be different in the case of a provision of a mixed agreement which is clearly outside Community competence, for example within the CFSP; even here it could be argued that there is a Community interest in securing performance of the whole agreement, and therefore a Community obligation on Member States not flowing from the agreement itself but rather from Art 10 EC. 96 The conclusion by the Member States of a mixed agreement also has an effect on their relations inter se. In fields covered by Community law, relations between the Member States are regulated by Community law, not international law. 97 Article 292 EC is an example of that general principle, 98 expressing "the duty of loyalty to the judicial 91 The Sellafield case in which the Commission brought an infringement action against Ireland alleging breach of Articles 10 and 292 EC illustrates the problem. 102 The issue is whether this inter-Member State dispute concerned "the interpretation or application of this Treaty" (Article 292 EC). The Advocate General expresses this as a question of whether the matters brought before the Arbitral Tribunal by Ireland, at least in part, "fall within the scope of Community law." 103 Ireland argued that in concluding UNCLOS, the Community only exercised its exclusive competence (e.g. in matters of fisheries conservation); other areas of the agreement falling within shared competence (including its environmental dimension 104 ) were concluded by the Member States. AG Poiares Maduro disagrees with this limited view of Community participation in the agreement, pointing out that the Council Decision concluding the agreement was based inter alia on Art 130s EC (environment policy). Drawing an analogy from the Etang de Berre case considered above, he finds that in concluding UNCLOS, the EC exercised not only its exclusive but also its non-exclusive competence, including in environmental fields, and that therefore these aspects are within the scope of Community law and so subject to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction. 105 The difficulty with this analysis is that apart from the legal base of the Council Decision concluding the agreement (which is, admittedly, important) there is no real evidence for this conclusion. It is arguable that the Declaration made by the EC under Annex IX of UNCLOS points the other way: Churchill and Scott bring out very clearly the ambiguity of the Declaration in this respect. 106 More importantly, the question itself is not the right one. The issue here is not to what extent the EC exercised its non-exclusive competence in concluding UNCLOS; given that there is agreement as to the existence of shared competence in the environmental field this is essentially a factual question and should not bear on the issue of protection of the autonomy of the Community legal order. As AG Maduro says, there is a great deal of Community law in the environmental field covered by UNCLOS, and the real issue is rather that a dispute under the agreement gave rise to issues within the scope of Community law. This would be so even if the Irish view were correct and in fact the Community had not concluded the environmental aspects of the agreement -there would still be a threat to the Community legal order if such issues were to be submitted to non-Community dispute settlement. It is the existence of this body of law which calls into play Article 292 EC (which refers, it will be recalled, to "the interpretation or application of this Treaty") rather than the question of either exercise of Community competence or responsibility for implementation. In fact, it is well established that the Member States' loyalty obligation under Article 10 EC applies also when they are exercising their own competence, and even to fields of activity that are outside Community competence altogether. Article 292 creates an obligation which is essentially internal to the Community legal order; it does not tell us anything about international responsibility (this will be discussed below in Chapter 2.2).
International responsibility
We can now turn to the question of international responsibility: put simply, who is responsible to third countries for the performance of a mixed agreement? More generally, questions arise as to the extent to which Member States might be liable for (implementing) the acts of a Community institution, and on the other hand the extent to which the Community might be held responsible for default by a Member State: the Bosphorus case 107 is an example of the former, the EC-Asbestos case 108 an example of the latter. Of course these issues arise both inside and outside the context of mixed agreements, but here we will focus specifically on mixed agreements.
Although the Court of Justice has said that in the case of a mixed agreement the division of competence between Member States and the Community is an internal question, 109 it does affect third countries and therefore has an external dimension. However, the approach to the internal and external dimensions of the question should, it is submitted here, be different. not the exercise of competence, but rather the scope of Community law and the preservation of the autonomy of the Community legal order. In contrast, in the external context, where responsibility towards third States is concerned, the allocation of competence is our starting point; hence the importance of Declarations of competence, discussed below. As we shall see, this does not necessarily exclude, however, the liability of the Community for default by a Member State in relation to the mixed agreement as a whole.
a. Where there is a Declaration of competence
Multilateral agreements that make provision for participation by regional economic integration organisations (REIOs) such as the EC alongside its Member States will often provide for a Declaration of competence by the REIO, specifying which areas of the agreement fall within the competence of the REIO and which within that of its Member States. The Court of Justice has explained their purpose clearly:
"Admittedly it goes without saying that the extent of the respective powers of the Community and the Member States with regard to the matters governed by the Protocol determines the extent of their respective responsibilities in relation to performance of the obligations under the Protocol. Article 34 (2) and (3) of the Convention takes account of that very consideration, in particular by requesting regional economic integration organisations which are party to the Convention or to any of its protocols to declare the extent of their competence in their instruments of approval and to inform the depositary of any relevant modification in the extent of that competence." 110 Thus, Declarations are intended to indicate to third countries the distribution of competence; in reality their helpfulness varies from case to case. In some cases they do little more than list relevant Community legislation, leaving the other Contracting Parties to draw their own conclusions as to the competence implications. 111 In other cases they are more indicative of competence; so for example the Declaration made by the EC under UNCLOS Annex IX mentions the existence of exclusive and shared competence and outlines the scope of exclusive competence; it does not however specify the implications of shared competence by making clear the extent to which the Community was actually exercising its shared competence in concluding the Convention. As we have seen, this became an issue in the Sellafield case. Annex IX foresees this problem, in providing that if a third State asks for information as to responsibility as between the EC and its Member States, and does not get an answer, or receives a contradictory answer, both the EC and its Member States will be jointly and severally liable. As Heliskoski points out, this provides a procedural solution to the tension between third States' demand for certainty as to responsibility and the Community's concern for autonomy and the dynamism of Community competence. 112 The Declaration of competence in relation to the Palermo Convention, in contrast, not only outlines Community competence in areas relevant to the Convention but makes express reference to relevant Articles of the Convention itself, indicating by which Articles it considers itself bound. 113 In the absence of a specific Declaration, other indications of competence may be found. Bilateral mixed agreements often have a clause defining the term "Contracting Parties" in such a way as to make it clear that competence is shared but without specifying the delimitation. 114 The legal base of the concluding Decision may also be an indication although it has been argued above that caution is needed in reading too much into the choice of legal base. 115 
b. Where there is no Declaration of competence
Where there is no declaration on the division of competence in a mixed agreement, the authorities differ as to whether international responsibility should be apportioned between the Community and its Member States according to their respective competences, or whether the Community and Member States could be regarded as jointly and severally responsible in international law for the whole agreement. The difficulty with the former approach lies in determining, with respect to those parts of the agreement that are within shared competence, to what extent the agreement can be said to have been concluded by the Community. As the Sellafield case illustrates, this is by no means straightforward even where there is a declaration of competence and in its absence there is a risk of uncertainty for third countries. On the other hand, as Heliskoski points out, the principle of joint and several liability undermines the very idea of a division of competence and the rationale behind the use of the mixed agreement. 116 Nevertheless, support for this approach can be found in the case law of the Court of Justice; in the EDF case the Court said: International law practitioners and courts are also debating the questions that arise concerning the international responsibility of international organisations, and in particular the attribution of acts to international organisations and/or their members. In 2002 the International Law Commission appointed Giorgio Gaja as Special Rapporteur on the Responsibility of International Organisations, as well as a Working Group on the topic. Since then, four reports of the Special Rapporteur have been published and a number of draft articles adopted by the ILC Drafting Committee, covering inter alia attribution of conduct to an international organisation and breach of international obligations. 123 This work is obviously of importance to the Community and mechanisms have been established to ensure that responses to the Working Group's work are coordinated between the Member States and the Commission. 124 Although this chapter has focused on international agreements, it should be remembered that issues of international responsibility for wrongful acts under international law have a broader application; as far as the European Union is concerned, as it extends its activities into the military and peacekeeping fields, these questions are likely to assume particular importance and the difficulties caused by its uncertain legal status need resolution. 125 The European Community, as Kuijper and Paasivirta point out, raises particular questions of both apportionment and attribution and the role played by the "rules of the organisation". There is an understandable desire that attribution and apportionment in the context of international responsibility should reflect delimitation of competence at the Community level.
To conclude this Chapter: in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, and in managing their implementation, 126 the division of competence between the Community and its Member States is clearly critical and forms the basis for an ultimate division of responsibility. Some of the issues arising have been discussed in Chapter 1. Turning to the issue of responsibility for fulfilment of the obligations under a mixed agreement, the position is inherently complex, as it inevitably reflects the interests of the Community legal order, of the Member States and of third parties. When considering Member State responsibility as a matter of internal Community law, the emphasis is on the needs of the Community legal order and the Community interest. Thus in all areas which fall within the scope of Community law (not necessarily co- equivalent to the exercise of Community competence in concluding the agreement), Member States bear a Community law obligation. This Community law obligation includes the duty of loyalty to the Community judicial process as expressed in Article 292 EC. However, in considering international responsibility towards third States for compliance with a mixed agreement, the interests of third States in legal certainty and the balance between Community and Member State competence need to be considered. An ex ante Declaration of competence will indicate where that balance lies and may provide a degree of legal certainty, although practice has shown that such Declarations do not answer all questions. There is some judicial support for an approach based on joint and several liability in cases where there is no ex ante Declaration, or where it is inconclusive. There is no doubt, however, that such an approach would tend to blur the distinction between Member State and Community participation in the agreement, a distinction whose importance is reflected in the very need for a mixed agreement -the reluctance of the Member States to accept sole Community participation in cases of concurrent competence. Heliskoski has argued that the potentially conflicting interests (of Community, Member States and third parties) can be reconciled through procedural mechanisms which ensure that the allocation of responsibility is carried out by the Community and Member States, not ex ante but as individual cases arise. 127 Joint and several liability would then operate as a default position to protect third parties in case of disagreement, rather than an a priori principle. 128 The principle underpinning such procedural mechanisms is the duty of cooperation, which provides the foundation for managing shared competence within mixed agreements. 129 In conclusion we should remember that "in practice, a claim for international responsibility against the Community has never failed for the reason that it has been brought against a "wrong party" in the context of mixed agreements." 130
Chapter 3 -Legal effects of international law
The relationship between international law and Community/Union law is of increasing relevance and importance for a number of reasons: in part it is a sign of the maturity of the Community legal order that in its early days needed to emphasise its distinction from "traditional" international law; 131 it is also partly the result of the extension of Union activity into the fields of security and defence, and the growing importance of individual and human rights within international law. As the ICJ itself has said: "International organisations are subjects of international law and as such are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties." 132 However these current developments are not simply a question of international organisations as themselves subjects of international law. Increasingly we see that the system of multilevel governance (whether in matters of trade, environmental protection or anti-terrorism) is not limited to the Community and national levels but also includes the international level, by which is meant not only that different jurisdictions are dealing with the same problems, but further that those jurisdictions are becoming increasingly integrated. 133 It is not surprising that we are seeing an increasing number of cross-jurisdictional cases, such as Sellafield, Bosphorus, Yusuf and Kadi, not to mention the cases involving the enforcement of WTO norms within the EC legal order, and that the Court of Justice has to deal more often with international law issues.
How then does the Community legal order perceive international law? It has been called "a supplementary constitutional law for the EU." 134 The Court of Justice has stated that the Community "must respect international law in the exercise of its powers," 135 and in the Racke case 136 it went further, holding that it had jurisdiction under Article 234 EC to review the legality of a Community act on grounds of breach of a rule of international law; the rules of customary international law were held to be not only binding on the institutions but part of the Community legal order. Likewise, in Opel Austria, the CFI applied the international law principles of good faith and legitimate expectations as expressed in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning the obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty before its entry into force. 137 In what follows we will consider the impact within the Community legal order of different sources of international law, starting with international agreements concluded by the Community, and then going on to look at UN law and human rights law in the specific context of sanctions legislation.
Community agreements a. Judicial review
Basing itself on Art 300(7) EC, the Court of Justice is clear that international agreements concluded by the Community are not only an integral part of the Community legal order (Haegeman 142 ), they also take precedence in the hierarchy of norms over acts of the Community legislature:
Article 300 ( As a preliminary point we should recall that the Court has not interpreted Article 300(7) EC to mean that Community agreements take precedence over primary Community law. In case C-122/95 Germany v Council for example, the Court was prepared to accept an argument that certain aspects of the Framework Agreement on Bananas were contrary to the fundamental Community law principle of non-discrimination. 144 Although this raises some important questions, in what follows we will focus on the issue of the compatibility of Community agreements with secondary Community law. 145 Returning to secondary legislation, AG Jacobs has argued for a general principle of judicial review:
"it might be thought that it is in any event desirable as a matter of policy for the Court to be able to review the legality of Community legislation in the light of treaties binding the Community. There is no other court which is in a position to review Community legislation; thus if this Court is denied competence, Member States may be subject to conflicting obligations with no means of resolving them." 146 International Fruit Company spelled out two conditions for such a review: the binding nature of the provision of international law, and that the provision is capable of conferring individual rights. 147 Both these conditions were held in case C-280/93 Germany v Council to apply even in direct actions for annulment of a Community act brought by a Member State. Since International Fruit Company itself the first condition (that the provision be binding) has rarely been an issue. 148 As far as agreements are concerned the Community is bound as a signatory in respect of the whole agreement, even where competence is shared and the agreement is mixed. 149 It is on that basis that AG Tesauro made the comments relating to the WTO agreements in the Hermes case cited above. In the context we are considering here (judicial review of acts of secondary legislation) it is unlikely that the provision of the agreement in question would fall outside the scope of Community law (and within Member State competence) since the Community has legislated in the field. 145 Were the Court to annul the Decision concluding the agreement on such grounds, its status within the Community legal order is somewhat doubtful: Lenaerts and De Smijter (supra note 136 at 103) suggest that it would cease to have effect within the Community legal order; however as far as international responsibility is concerned, the Community would remain liable to its contracting parties unless it could be claimed that the conditions set out in Article 46(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply: "Although the contested Council Decision must therefore be declared void, that does not change the legal situation under international law, according to which the Community, by adopting a convention which has meanwhile entered into force, remains bound by it. That follows from the principles of the general law of treaties, as they are laid down, for example, in 148 It was an issue at the time of the International Fruit Company decision in relation to the GATT, as the Community at that time was not a party, the Court having therefore first to hold that it was nevertheless bound by the provisions of the GATT. As the Court said in Case C-377/98, at para 52, "as a rule, the lawfulness of a Community instrument does not depend on its conformity with an international agreement to which the Community is not a party." Since then the binding nature of an international law provision has been discussed in relation to customary international law (Racke) and the United Nations Charter (Yusuf): see further discussion in chapter 3.2. 149 Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, at para 7.
The case law of the Court in which it has held consistently that the WTO does not fulfil the second of these conditions is very familiar; we consider the WTO further below in the context of the protection of individual rights. More recently (and outside the WTO context), the ECJ has broken down the second limb of the International Fruit Company test into its two constituent parts and applied these, 150 The contrast with the reasoning in case C-280/93 Germany v Council is noticeable, consolidating the separation between the concept of the "nature and structure" of an agreement as a criteria for judicial review and the protection of individual rights. The reliance on Racke is also significant, suggesting that the Court wishes to emphasise the binding nature of international law in relation to the acts of the institutions. 153 There is also an interesting reference to the need for the Community to avoid placing obligations on its Member States that would be contrary to their international law obligations: the Court was prepared to consider the compatibility of the contested Directive with the TRIPS, on the ground that the real issue was not whether Community legislation complied with the agreement, but rather whether the Directive required the Member 150 We refer here to the conditions for direct effect set out in the Kupferberg and Demirel case law: (i) the nature and structure of the agreement, and (ii) the unconditional and precise character of the specific provision. States to breach their international law obligations. 154 The willingness of the Court of Justice to accept judicial review of secondary legislation on the basis of the nature and structure of the agreement in almost all cases except the WTO is striking and welcome; it is to be hoped that the trend away from regarding direct effect as a condition of judicial review in direct actions continues.
b. Creation of individual rights
The nature and structure of the agreement is of course also a part of the test when deciding whether a Community agreement is capable of creating individual rights enforceable before the courts (domestic and European). Here too we find a clear divergence between the WTO case law and that dealing with most other agreements.
In the case of Association Agreements and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements the Court has recently continued in its attitude of relative openness to direct effect. In its interpretation of the "Europe" Association Agreements (EAs) the Court has clearly been influenced by their nature and structure as agreements designed to further closer integration with the Community and its legal order. In a number of cases, provisions of the EAs, particularly those dealing with establishment, have been found to create directly effective rights. 155 In Panayotova 156 Advocate General Poiares Maduro, referring to the importance of context, objectives and purpose in the interpretation of agreements (Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) points to the "political re-orientation" of the EAs towards the accession of the associate States and the effect that should have on their interpretation, arguing that it is this context which explains the approach to interpretation adopted by the Court. 157 Certainly the Court has not only been prepared to grant direct effect to provisions of these agreements, it has also noticeably interpreted their provisions in line with existing case law on the EC Treaty. 158 The principle of effective judicial protection has also been extended to cover individuals exercising rights granted under the Europe Agreements, as a general principle which stems from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and which is found in the European Convention on Human Rights, 159 and on the basis that the EA has become an integral part of the Community legal order within which such general principles apply. 160 Given the references in the judgements on the EAs to their accession context, it is interesting to see similar reasoning being applied to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia, which has no accession dimension and which is certainly more limited in its scope and ambition than the EAs. In Simutenkov the Court not only held the nondiscrimination obligation as regards working conditions for legally resident Russian nationals within the Community to be directly effective, it then went on to apply its rulings in Bosman (under the EC Treaty) and Kolpak (under the EC-Slovakia EA). 161 The Court rightly mentions that other cooperation agreements have been found to be capable of direct effect; although the objectives of the EC-Russia PCA are different from the EA at issue in Kolpak (and certainly different from the EC Treaty), it appears to argue that the approach to non-discrimination taken in Bosman and Kolpak "follows from the ordinary sense of the words" and can therefore be applied, in the absence of any contrary indication, to the PCA. This interpretation, however, includes the ruling that the principle of non-discrimination applies not only to the State but to rules laid down by sports federations. The Court is thus prepared to extend a form of horizontal direct effect to the provisions of the EAs and PCA.
One further comment might be made about this case law. Of course, the Court's interpretations and findings of direct effect apply only within the Community legal order, and do not bind the other Contracting Party; 162 but these cases demonstrate that the Community legal order has "fuzzy edges," with the extension of Community-type freedoms and non-discrimination rights to non-EC nationals. Is it really, in these circumstances, so irrelevant that the other Contracting Party does not accept direct effect? 163 The Court of Justice and the CFI have recently confirmed their restrictive approach to individual rights under the WTO agreements. 164 Most recently the issue has been raised in the context of rulings of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The Community's capacity to conclude international agreements "necessarily entails the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such an agreement as regards the interpretation and application of its provisions." 165 As far as the WTO is concerned, the result is ambiguous: on the one hand, the Court of Justice has stressed the importance of the DSU as a mechanism for enforcing WTO obligations and the early reluctance of the Community to involve itself with international dispute settlement 166 seems to have disappeared. On the other hand, the CFI has refused to give effect to an Appellate Body ruling when relied on by an individual in order to determine the existence of an unlawful act in an action for damages against the Community institutions. 167 Applying the standard tests for the liability of the Community institutions in damages, the CFI in this recent case examined whether there had been an unlawful act in the sense of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. It then refused to find that a failure on the part of the Community institutions to implement a DSB ruling constituted an "unlawful act". Rather than basing itself on a possible argument that the rule of law in question (the provisions of the GATT, GATS and the DSB decision) was not intended to confer rights on individuals the CFI draws a striking conclusion from the Court of Justice's case law on the WTO: although the principle of pacta sunt servanda is "a fundamental principle of all legal orders and particularly of the international legal order" it cannot be relied upon in this case "since, in accordance with settled case-law, the WTO agreements are not in principle, given their nature and structure, among the rules in the light of which the Community courts review the legality of action by the Community institutions." 168 The CFI goes into some detail as to whether or not one of the exceptions to this principle might apply, but decides that they do not; the reasons given by the Court of Justice for refusing to use WTO rules as a basis for judicial review are not altered by the adoption of the DSB decision. In spite of the DSB decision finding an infringement, then, the CFI concludes that "the defendant institutions' conduct cannot be regarded as unlawful". 169 Although the attitude of the Community Courts towards the WTO has attracted a great deal of comment, this case at least needs to be seen in the broader context of actions for non-contractual liability in the light of international obligations, where we see a similarly restrictive approach. In Dorsch Consult for example, the CFI held that there was no causal link between the Community sanctions Regulation and the damage caused, on the grounds that the damage could not be attributed to the Community which was simply implementing its obligations under a Security Council Resolution. 170 In another recent case the CFI took the view that an alleged breach of the Ankara Association Agreement with Turkey cannot provide the basis of an action in damages on the ground that it does not meet the tests for direct effect as laid down in Demirel: "having regard to its nature and scheme, the Ankara Agreement is not included, in principle, in the norms in whose light the Court of First Instance reviews the lawfulness of the acts of the Community institutions." 171 As in Fiamm, therefore, the CFI is applying a restrictive approach to unlawfulness in the context of a damages action. 
The UN Treaty and Human Rights: the example of sanctions
Sanctions cases provide a real testing ground for the rules governing the relationship between international law and Union/Community law: they rely for their effectiveness on a close interaction between international law (especially UN Security Council Resolutions), Union/Community law and national law; in addition they raise important questions of fundamental human rights as protected at the international, Community and national levels. Bethlehem has rightly argued that from the point of view of effective implementation of sanctions, functional cooperation between these different systems is more important than their precise hierarchical relationship; 172 however that relationship has proved to be important when it is a matter of accountability and human rights protection. In Dorsch Consult the CFI held that the damage caused by a trade embargo could not be attributed to the Community: the Community in adopting its Regulation was merely enabling the Member States to fulfil their obligations under the UNSCR in an area of exclusive Community competence. 173 Following a similar logic in the context of judicial review, the CFI in Yusuf and Kadi held that the absence of any discretion on the part of the Member States and Community in implementing the UNSCR in question means that any challenge to the legality of the Community act amounted to an indirect challenge to the underlying UNSCR, and that such a challenge would be contrary to the binding nature of such international law obligations, especially to Article 103 of the UN Charter: "the resolutions of the Security Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court's judicial review and that the Court has no authority to call in question, even indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community law." 174 In Yusuf and Kadi the CFI goes further than in Dorsch Consult in formulating the exact way in which the Community is bound to implement a UN Security Council Resolution. It puts forward an interesting argument to the effect that the Community itself is bound; not only does it have the power to carry out certain of the Member States' obligations, and (under Article 307 EC) the obligation not to obstruct the Member States in the performance of their prior treaty obligations towards third countries. 175 The CFI argues that not as a matter of international law (as it is not a member of the United Nations), but in terms of Community law itself, the Community "must be considered to be bound by the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations in the same way as its 172 Bethlehem, "International Law, European Community Law, National Law: Three Systems Member States". 176 By analogy with the arguments used in relation to the binding nature of the GATT in International Fruit Company, the EC Treaty is evidence of a willingness that the Community should be so bound, and insofar as the Member States have transferred powers to the Community those powers must be used in conformity with those obligations. There is no space here to detail every step in the Court's reasoning, but its conclusion is important: that the Community is bound by the UN Charter (and therefore by UNSCR) as a matter of Community law. If this is the case, however, the basis on which the Court declined judicial review is undermined; if UN obligations take effect within the Community legal order as a matter of Community constitutional law, then there is no reason why an act of the institutions giving effect to such an obligation should not be judged in the light of other constitutional principles of the Community legal order, including of course the protection of fundamental human rights. There would then need to be a discussion as to the relative force of these different principles within the Community's constitution but there is no justification for denying review altogether. 177 Indeed, the Court of Justice engaged in just such a review in the Bosphorous case, in which it not only interpreted a sanctions Regulation taking into account the text and aims of the UNSCR which it implemented, but also then went on to consider a claim that the Regulation should be declared invalid on grounds of proportionality and breaches of human rights. 178 Although the Court of Justice in the Bosphorus case declared the Regulation to be in conformity with Community law, Ireland was held to account before the European Court of Human Rights in respect of its implementation of the Regulation. 179 The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to the issue of attribution, responsibility and review is an interesting contrast to that of the CFI. In Yusuf the CFI argued that because the institutions had no autonomous discretion, to review the Community Regulation would be tantamount to reviewing the UNSCR: "the origin of the illegality alleged by the applicant would have to be sought, not in the adoption of the contested regulation but in the resolutions of the Security Council which imposed the sanctions." 180 The European Court of Human Rights on the other hand is clear that even where the Member States are implementing their (international and Community law) obligations without discretion they are responsible for compliance with the ECHR; there is no absolution of responsibility from ECHR obligations whenever a Contracting Party is implementing EC law. The absence of discretion did not prevent the act being attributed to Ireland, nor did it absolve it from its Convention obligations. The Court's assessment of Ireland's compliance then rests on its doctrine of "equivalence" whereby "State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides." 181
These cases raise again the issue of international responsibility, in particular the question of "piercing the organisational veil", the extent to which Members of an organisation may be held liable for acts attributed to that organisation. 182 In cases where the Member States have no discretion in implementing decisions adopted by international organisations it could be argued that the Member State is effectively acting as agent of the organisation and thus the organisation and not the Member State should be liable. 183 On this view, the Bosphorus case should be seen in the light of the fact that the EC is not a party to the Convention and thus action against the Community as such is not possible. However, to regard Member States as somehow acting as agents for the EC even in matters of exclusive competence does not really reflect the complexity of the Community legal order, or the way in which international, Community and domestic law interacts in such cases. If we are to reflect the functional distribution of powers between these different legal orders, it should not be possible for either a State or an international organisation to deny responsibility, no matter the binding nature of the obligation it was implementing; and if the originator organisation's rules leave no room for discretion on the part of the implementing authority, then in addition it should be possible to hold that organisation indirectly responsible. Whichever approach is adopted, questions will remain within each legal system as to the norms against which the legality of institutional or State acts may be measured, and the hierarchy of norms within that system, and it is on those issues that the Yusuf and Bosphorus cases offer differing perspectives. Finally, we should remember that where sanctions or other restrictive measures are adopted in relation to individuals not on the basis of the EC Treaty, but under CFSP powers only, there is at present no possibility for judicial review before the Court of Justice. 184 In such cases, the role of national courts and the European Court of Human Rights is critical.
To conclude this chapter: as an international organisation the EC is a subject of and therefore subject to international law. As a matter of its own legal order, the Court of Justice has said that the Community is bound by the general rules of customary international law and in the view of the CFI the Community is also bound, as a matter of its own constitutional system, by the UN Charter. However judicial review of sanctions measures by affected individuals has proved difficult to achieve. International agreements entered into by the Community are binding on the Community institutions and will take precedence over secondary legislation, although the conditions under which individuals may rely on such agreements to challenge the legality of such legislation either directly or as part of an action for damages may be restrictive, depending on the view taken by the Community Courts as to the nature and structure of the specific agreement. Application of Community agreements at national level is marked by a willingness of the Court of Justice to accept their potential for the creation of individual rights and, taking into account the different objectives and context of the agreements, the interpretation of those rights in the light of its case law on the EC Treaty. Although therefore the position of international law within the Community legal order might appear to be clear, a number of uncertainties remain concerning the hierarchy of norms as between international law and primary or fundamental principles of Community law (including the protection of human rights), and the conditions under which Community acts may be declared unlawful as a result of a breach of international law, including treaty obligations. There is no doubt that we will continue to see these issues emerge regularly in litigation before the Community Courts.
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